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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
To begin with there is and was an attitude and overview that existed before the charges
were made in this case. In the testimony of J.D. Huff, the current chief of police, in testifYing
regarding the Defendant's record on this property and situation shows that the city's perspective
and position was and is that there is no constitutional right to continue a prior non-conforming
use of property (Tr., p. 73, L. 7-10; Defendant's Exhibit D). John's (the Defendant's) father
was told that there were no grandfather rights. The Appellant's statement of the case provides a
somewhat accurate sequence. Respondent's argument points out where the perspective is
different.
The State continues to make an issue of whether or not the Defendant had a license to be
a collector or dismantler or to operate a junkyard. At no place has the State shown that the use
complained of was illegal prior to 1973. First, the existence of such a legal requirement was not
made an issue below, that is, there was no evidence submitted showing such a license was ever
available, let alone required. Second, the Defendant to have to prove the negative in such a case is
not available nor required.
If this case is to view the Standard of Review the Respondent takes issue with the
argument made. Number one, a Constitutional Right is not necessarily subservient to a city's
exercise of police power. This is even more so when the exercise of that police power can be
accomplished without doing violence to the Defendant's Constitutional Right. This appellate
review is of the record of the magistrate judge independentl y of the decision of the district judge.
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2007). It does not appear that the trial court appreciated
the fact that there was a constitutional issue.

The State continues to burden this case with the issue of a violation of the weed
ordinance, city code 8-2A-1. That charge was dismissed at the conclusion of the trial and that
ruling was not appealed. The issue should be moot.
The State sets forth as fact in its "statement of facts" that despite being "served with
numerous notices." The record does not support that statement. The ordinance has particularly
described how notice of removal is to be given. See ordinance 8-2B-4-A-l. At first it may
appear that the notice service may apply only to a "Removal by City", but reading further,
subsection B of that part of the ordinance incorporates and declares a misdemeanor only "whcn
ordered to do so in accordance with the provisions of this article." Ordinance 8-2B-4-B. Again,
it is error to say that service of notice was not needed. It is required for there to be a
misdemeanor.
The declared "public nuisance may be abated as such in accordance with the provisions of
this article."

2

ARGUMENT
Constitutional Right
The Defendant's use of the real property for which he is charged, under the Fruitland
City Ordinance 8-2B-1, 2, 3 & 4, is a pre-existing non-conforming use the city seeks to abate
under the zoning ordinance passed in 1973. The ordinance seeks to prohibit the use which predates the ordinance. The evidence shows that as early as 1950 the use of the property
complained of had commenced. This would have been a use that Defendant's father had started.
[n

1962 the Defendant joined his father in the use complained of in the charges made. (Tr., p.

102, L. 2-4). That continues to date. The Defendant's mother also joined in collecting vehicles
on the property. (Tr., p. 104, L.2-12). An ordinance which prohibits such a use is an
unconstitutional taking without due process in violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments of the
Constitution ofthe United States and Article 1, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution.
"[tJhe right to use one's property in a lawful manner is within the protection of
subdivision (1) of the 14th Amendment ofihe Constitution of the United States and Article 1,
Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution providing no person shan be deprived of Efe, liberty or
property without due process oflaw." O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 42-43
(1949).

It is the "use, not ownership (that) is the concern of this type of zoning." O'Connor v.
City of Moscow, supra.
The court citing authority oflong standing in O'Connor recites:
"Property in a thing consists not merely in its ownership and possession, but in
the unrestricted right to use, enjoyment and disposal. Anyihing which destroys
any of these elements of property, to that extent destroys the property itself."
69 Idaho at 42.

3

Notice
The notice provisions of the ordinance are found in Fruitland City Ordinance 8-2B-4. A
crime is identified in 8-2B-4-B following the notice or order in 8-2B-4-A and then when " ... fail
or refuse to remove ... when ordered to do so in accordance with the provisions of this article."
The notice provisions ofthe ordinance are unreasonable to say the least. Where is the
authority to put a time limit on constitutional rights? A ten day notice provision is not shown to
be sufficient due process to satisfy a constitutional protection. The only satisfaction sho\vn in
the law or due process is just compensation where one is deprived of a property right.
It is clear from reading the ordinance that the intent is to give the Defendant notice of

removal and what he can expect ifhe fails to comply with the orders in the notice. To fail to give
that notice and strictly comply with the provisions of the ordinance leaves the Defendant to
guess at what is expected. What is ordered and what does one do if they disagree with the order?
Ifthere is no clear order what are they to do?
Beyond a reasonable doubt it is not clear that the Defendant could know before he was
cited that his constitutional right was being over-ruled and he only had ten days to correct things.
The way this service 0 f notice was handled when did the ten days start, when did the ten days
end, when was there then a violation according to the order? Was the ten day notice even
provided?
Strictly construing the notice provisions of the ordinance it is clear that the provisions of
the ordinance were not complied with.
"The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed m favor
of defendants." State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, ] 03 (2008).
" ... the clearly expressed intent ofthe legislature must be given effect, ... " State
v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365 (1996).
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It is not that the notice provisions of the ordinance are ambiguous. But the conduct of the

city in not complying with the notice provisions leaves a person without a clear understanding of
what the city expects.
In this case, the record is devoid of evidence of service of such a notice as is required by
the ordinance. It is even devoid of evidence that whatever notice is referred to uses language the
ordinance requires in that notice. The best that can be said is the attempt to summarize the
content of a letter;
" ... some of .. most of the letter contained the content of the ordinance violations, the
junk vehicles and the weed problem." (Tr., p. 23, L. 6-8).
"It advised him of the weeds, that's when the weeds started taking off, and the fuel load

around the vehicles and the vehicles themselves. We'd like 10 have the vehicles removed, .
. ." (Tr., p. 30, L. 12-14, L. 20-21).
Service of notice does not appear to be "in accordance with the provisions of' the
ordinance. Certainly not beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ordinance 8-2B-4: Removal Procedures)
At the conclusion of the trial Defendant filed and argued a Motion to Dismiss for failure
to give notice to the Defendant " ... according to the provisions of this article (the ordinance)." It
is not until the point of proper service and the Defendant's failure or refusal that a crime, the
misdemeanor, has occurred. From the record it cannot be determined if there was such a notice or
order as provided by the ordinance. Nor can it be determined if that notice or order was served as
intended. Without that there is no misdemeanor. The trial court erred (Tr., p. 112, L. 14-17).
The trial court found that notice was not required.
The Court did not insist on a copy of the notice - there was no basis upon which to
determine if there was compliance. In fact, trial court ruled that the notice is only to be given
before the city can go in and remove. A plain reading of the ordinance, 8-2B-2 and 4, shows that
the misdemeanor is not declared until after such a notice and refusal to remove, 8-2B-4-B.
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The Defendant is entitled to require that that notice and service procedure of the
ordinancc be strictly complied with. State v. McCoy, supra.
Until the "Removal Procedures" are commenced and complied with there can be no
misdemeanor and the criminal citation issued. The notice is to the owner or occupant. It is a
misdemeanor when the owner or occupant fails or refuses to remove as "ordered to do so in
accordance with the provisions of this article." Until then it is a civil matter.
1s this not a part of due process to which a Defendant is entitled?
Ordinance Defective On Its Face
A careful reading of the ordinance together with an understanding of the 1aw is that a preeXisting non-confomling use is constitutionally protected. Seeing that the ordinance ignores that
constitutional right, what is one to do? Apparently a difference of opinion exists on whether a
person in such a situation violates the law, as in this case, or that it is a constitutional right to be
protected. This ordinance, in its silence concerning prior uses, is ambiguous and confusing.
The ordinance, having undertaken to spell out the exemptions under the ordinance, fails to
acknowledge an established constitutional right of prior, and now non-conforming, use. On its
face and with its own language the ordinance is not adequate. It would seem more reasonable that
a just compensation procedure be provided for the taking rather than a criminal prosecution.
With a city ordinance that enumerates the exemptions from the ordinance but fails to
acknowledge a constitutional right; that enforcement against the Defendant having failed to
comply with the terms of enforcement of the ordinance and provide the Defendant with the
required notice under the ordinance, all in an attempt to take property without due process is not
simply an unreasonable exercise of the police power of the city, but under the facts of this case is
an abuse of that police power. One thing is clear: The ordinance, though it lists exemptions to

6

the ordinance, fails to recognize a Constitutional Right to continue a prior but now nonconforming use of property.
We see in this case a very short time limit placed on any such use, i.e. thirty days and
then ten days after the order to abate. \Vhen and where is it that Constitutional Rights have a
time limit? Some cases use language that limits the use to be protected. Some language limits it
to the owner as the only one entitled to claim the right; but what of a lessee claiming that right
when he has been charged criminally? What of other pem1itted users of the property who are
criminally charged but cannot defend on the basis of a Constitutional Right, having no title?
In the instant case, what of family members continuing a family enterprise? One family
member, the son, is charged 'with a crime, but is not one whose name appears on the title. As
punishment for the son's crime he is to abate the use andlor face jail time, as well as pay fines.
The city accomplishes abating the use without due process or compensation for the owner of the
property. Is this the way to abate a Constitutional Right without compensation? Is that due
process?
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CONCLUSION
The answer is that the issue is not, should not be, a criminal one, but a civil law issue.
Any city, county or the state has available to them the due process procedure to accomplish their
purpose. Idaho Code §7-701, et. seq. This was a statute intended to provide due process for
such a "taking."
If the nuisance claimed and exigency exists such as to warrant the criminal charge then it
would seem that it is sufficient to warrant the exercise of eminent domain.
The trial court erred and this matter should be dismissed.
DATED This_

/3_ day of November, 2012.

Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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